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Stylists in the American Grain
Wallace Stevens, Stanley Cavell and Richard Rorty
Aine Kelly
If there is now a tradition of American literature, it
starts from penury of circumstance and achieves,
at enormous personal cost, a style never secure in
the possession of itself, but always pursuing its
best and most difficult self.1
1 According to Denis Donoghue, the characteristic American style emerges from conditions
amounting to failure. Achieving vitality by a conscientious labour to transform failure
into  success,  its  creativity  proceeds  not  from  abundance  but  from  destitution,
“converting penury in substance to plenitude in the realized form” (Style:  109).  Like
Richard Poirier, Donoghue locates this failure in the peculiarly American experience of a
radical  separation  of  imagination  and  reality,  a  rift  between  consciousness  and
experience.2 Both critics find in the American imagination a “desperate metaphysic,” a
failure to find proper sustenance in the given world. American writing, Donoghue finally
contends,  “is characterized by the precarious achievement of style”;  it  emerges most
habitually “in conditions nearly desperate and against all the odds” (Style: 125).
2 Donoghue,  of course,  speaks for American literature before American philosophy. His
essay draws on Henry James,  Henry Adams and Allen Tate before turning to Wallace
Stevens’ late poetry and prose. Is it possible, however, that this “style of failure” might
speak  to  the  thinkers  and  writers  of  a  specifically  American  philosophical  tradition?
Donoghue’s hypothesizing, in the same extract, is more than a feature of his eloquent
writing style and still  questions, even as late as 1976, whether there is a tradition of
American literature to speak of in the first place. Those wishing to make a claim for
“American  philosophy,”  not  to  mention  the  infinitely  more  specific  and  contentious
claims for a characteristically American philosophical style, have a much tougher task than
Donoghue’s seminal essay, and significantly less firmer footing.
3 This in mind, I propose an unlikely trio of American writers – the modernist poet, Wallace
Stevens, the contemporary philosophers, Stanley Cavell and Richard Rorty – as touch-
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stones for this debate, re-describers of its central thesis, as Rorty might say. Stevens,
Cavell  and  Rorty  have  always  been  noted  for  philosophical  commitment  as  well  as
stylistic flair. Most obviously united by a shared ability to inspire philosophical interest
and  passion,  the  writings  of  Cavell  and  Rorty  provide  a  welcome  addition  to  a
professionalized discourse (that of contemporary analytic philosophy) too often marked
by aridity and over-specialisation, while Stevens’ epistemological promptings have long
been considered an inspiring addition to philosophical schools as diverse as Husserlian
phenomenology  and  Jamesian  pragmatism.  Encouraging  a  hearing  between  American
literature  and  philosophy,  all  three  writers  highlight  the  issue  and  importance  of
philosophy’s  writing,  as  they work to find a place for literature in the philosophical
conversation.
⁂
4 It is an accepted fact of philosophical and literary scholarship that the writing style of
Stanley Cavell is difficult. Challenging, complex, intricate, intractable, obstinate, testing
and tough – and that’s  for  the reader with more than a passing familiarity with the
writings of Cavell’s chosen philosophical forbears: Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David
Thoreau,  Friederich  Nietzsche  and  Martin  Heidegger,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  and  John
Langshaw Austin. There’s a profound sense of struggle in Cavell’s writing, of intellectual
labours enacted directly and unflinchingly in his reader’s presence. Consider the passage
from In Quest of the Ordinary where Cavell discusses the Wordsworth poem, “Intimations of
Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood”: “In this poem, about recovering from
the  loss  of  childhood  by  recovering  something  of,  or  in  childhood  (in  particular,
recovering its forms of recovery), we are to recover it, participate in it, by imitating it, as
it imitated us (so imitating its endless readiness for imitation).”3
5 The phrasing here is endlessly refracted and recursive, as Cavell urges the recording of
minute distinctions and clarifications, the murmuring of repetitions and variations, the
parenthetic asides within clauses within asides. Typifying a writing practice that has a
frustrating tendency to turn back on itself, and to do so just at the moment when it might
begin to satisfy or even to progress, Cavell’s sentence style refuses not just argument but
the very promise of logical progression, of intellectual resolution, of cadence.
6 The  self-conscious  difficulty  of  Cavell’s  style  is  a  feature  he  recognises  in  his  own
philosophical forbears,  and one he relates specifically to the writing of philosophy in
America. Cavell pictures Emerson’s language as continuously struggling with itself, “as if
he is  having to  translate,  in  his  American idiom,  English into English.”4 There is  an
obvious frustration here, an inherited disappointment with the potentialities of American
expression. Adding further weight to this Emersonian burden, and a further condition to
which Cavell holds his writing responsive, is his sense of philosophy as now existing in a
modernist state. As early as 1967, in “A Matter of Meaning It,” Cavell had argued that all
modernist art works (his examples ranged from Pop Art to the theatre of Beckett to the
music of John Cage) are characterized by “the possibility of fraudulence.”5 And just as
there is no standing discourse that explains or justifies what modern art is, there is no
standing discourse that accounts for the practice of philosophy. The implicit suggestion is
that  philosophy  must  continuously  place  into  question  and  affirm  its  own  identity;
because of its vulnerability to “false seriousness,” it must work to manage continuity with
itself. “The writing of philosophy,” Cavell affirms, “is difficult in a new way” (MWM: xxiii).
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7 Even more than this, however, Cavell’s writing is intimately tied to the moral outlook he
wishes to defend, that of moral perfectionism. Moral perfectionism is founded on the idea
that there is an unattained but attainable self that one ought to strive to reach, an idea
Cavell  traces from Emerson to Nietzsche to John Stuart Mill,  and detects traces of in
Rousseau and Kant.  Ironically,  what critics sometimes interpret as an aversiveness in
Cavell’s style is partly explained by this perfectionism, this idea that we must continually
fight  towards  expressiveness,  that  we  are  morally  responsible  for  making  ourselves
understood by each other. Writing, then, cannot merely signify the clear formulation of
texts  and  ideas  but  must  enact  a  deeply  personal  work  of  self-critique  and  self-
transformation. It is a challenging, a stretching, of one’s actual self.
8 The burdens of self-expression weigh heavily on Cavell. His writing places extraordinary
pressure on itself to describe, undistractedly and specifically, the processes of mind and
the allusiveness of thought. This labour testifies not only to Cavell’s modernism, to his
perfectionism,  but  to  his  life-long  wish  to  involve  his  writing  in  the  procedures  of
ordinary language philosophy. Following Wittgenstein, Cavell recognizes the limited and
limiting nature of our human utterances, the gap between our world and how we describe
it, the frailty, in general, of our “forms of life.” He speaks obsessively of Wittgenstein’s
call to bring words back “from their metaphysical to their everyday use,” as if our words
have long been estranged from us, meaningless, distant;  and it might be the task of a
modernist  philosophy  to  “improvise  a  sense  for  them.”6 Regaining  lost  intimacy,
strangely, is a key intention of Cavell’s difficult prose.
9 In ways that are simultaneously fascinating and frustrating, Wallace Stevens’ poetry may
be said to reflect this awareness, to record a comparable struggle. Stevens’ scepticism
about the external world (or, more precisely, his scepticism about the relation between
imagination and reality) lies at the heart of his poetic investigations. Time and again,
Stevens  observes  how reality  is  ultimately  unreachable  in  thought  and writing,  how
language  never  fully  manages  to  overlap  with  the  world  of  the  senses.  His  poetry
demonstrates a marked tendency to seek out the difficulties of the human experience of
the world, to court the attendant frustrations of the relationship between thought and
language. “The Snow Man,” from Stevens’ first collection Harmonium (1923), is a typical
example:
The Snow Man
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow,
And have been cold a long time
To behold the junipers shagged with ice,
The spruces rough in the distant glitter
Of the January sun; and not to think
Of any misery in the sound of the wind, 
In the sound of a few leaves,
Which is the sound of the land
Full of the same wind
That is blowing in the same bare place
For the listener, who listens in the snow, 
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.
10 Dramatizing the possibility of a truth without human perspective,  a reality devoid of
imaginative correspondence, “The Snow Man” is the most frequently cited of Stevens’
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early  poems  of  epistemology.  The  poem’s  overarching  mood  is  one  of  aridity  and
coldness. Instead of deprivation, however, the guiding sense is of enabling freshness, of
stark purity, the possibility of clearest perception. Through simple diction and concrete
imagery (as a Pound or Williams might, Stevens captures the specificities of a cold, clear
January), the poem lulls its reader through a single sentence, drawn out over five oddly
rhymed tercets, before culminating in its infamous, seemingly paradoxical, closure. In a
description that  might  apply  just  as  accurately  to  himself,  Cavell  calls  Stevens  “this
strange, wondrous, often excrutiatingly difficult writer.”7 “The Snow Man,” certainly, is
both strange and difficult. Looking ahead to the disquieting reserve of “The Plain Sense of
Things,” the bleak detachment of “Not Ideas About The Thing But the Thing Itself” and
the unsettling austerity of “The Course of a Particular,” the poem introduces Stevens’
essential philosophical voice as one of abstraction, impersonality, reserve.
11 This  esotericism continues  to  Stevens’  later  verse,  where  the  frameworks  of  human
thought and language are unflinchingly studied, and found lacking. We see this in “The
Poems of Our Climate” and “The Plain Sense of Things” but also, and perhaps even more
starkly,  in  “An  Ordinary  Evening  in  New  Haven.”  Here  the  poet  writes,  “We  fling
ourselves, constantly longing, on this form,” highlighting not only “the difficulty of the
visible” but our own engagement with this difficulty:
We keep coming back and coming back
To the real […]
We seek
The poem of pure reality, untouched
By trope or deviation, straight to the word, 
Straight to the transfixing object, to the object 
At the exactest point at which it is itself.
12 There  is  perhaps  a  tension  here  between  Stevens’  wish  to  investigate  the  limits  of
language and his desire to transcend language altogether, to write “the poem of pure
reality, untouched / By trope or deviation.” We might relate this to the desire expressed
both in “The Man With The Blue Guitar” (“Throw away the lights, the definitions, […] //
But do not use the rotted names”) and “Credences of Summer” (“let’s see the very thing
and nothing else / Let’s see it with the hottest fire of sight”). The linking suggestion is
that such a relation to the thing-in-itself  (Kant’s noumenal realm, though Stevens’  is
more likely to use the term “reality”) is simply impossible, that reality must always be
transfigured by the human imagination, and by language. As Helen Vendler has noted,
Stevens’ is a poetry of “enacted mental process.”8 A “reflexive intelligence” (Music: 77),
one that cannot evade a knowledge of its own processes, is forever fore-grounded as the
subject of his poems.
13 Stevens  and  Cavell  both  understand  that  there  is  something  both  disquieting  and
essential about the way we possess language, that the ordinary possibilities of human
communication and encounter are disappointing. As Cavell acknowledges the frailty of our
agreements and encourages a greater investigation of our language use, Stevens observes,
time  and  again,  how  reality  is  ultimately  unreachable  in  thought  and  writing,  how
language never fully manages to overlap with the world of the senses. Its “flawed words”
and “stubborn sounds” will always create a barrier between subject and object; in the
central  terms  of  his  work,  reality  will  always  “resist”  the  imagination.  For  both
philosopher and poet, the job is to maintain the world, to maintain language, against the
corroding onslaught of scepticism.
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14 Sharply at odds with these anxious rehearsals, Richard Rorty would gladly “slough off”
epistemological  concern,  would  gladly  picture  language  as  unproblematic,  or
instrumental.  Rorty’s  hunch  that  pragmatism  is  best  elaborated  using  a  Darwinian
vocabulary leads to his conception of words as “tools,” naturally evolved for coping with
the  world  rather  than  representing  it.  Although  he  recognises  the  contingency  of
language (together with the contingency of self and community) this contingency induces
in Rorty no sceptical anxiety. Rather, he seeks to alter our whole philosophical approach
to language so that we are less inclined to worry about the association between it and any
extra-linguistic considerations, less inclined to use language as a quasi-technical means of
“bootstrapping” ourselves out of all our philosophical troubles. Rorty would prefer us to
enlarge  our  linguistic  frame  of  reference,  to  reflect  on  the  historical  fate  of  whole
vocabularies.
15 The question of style, still, is fundamental. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty
argued that  the  quest  for  knowledge  and epistemological  certitude  had always  been
captive to its own engrossing metaphors (chief among these, famously, is that of the mind
as mirror, the “glassy essence” of the soul, wherein all the representations of external
reality are to be found). It thus became the task of philosophy to legitimate this picture of
its work by forgetting the swerve into metaphor which first produced, and still sustains,
its discourse. It became the task of philosophy, in other words, to ignore the salient fact
of its textual (or rhetorical) constitution. For pragmatists and poststructuralists alike,
Rorty contends, philosophy amounts to nothing more (or nothing less) than a style of
writing,  a  literary  genre  and  language  practice.  On  this  model,  there  is  simply  no
discipline  or  method  capable  of  transcending  its  own  discourse,  no  way  of  getting
beneath language to the thought it expresses, nothing to free us from the contingency of
our vocabularies.
16 Like Derrida, Rorty thus rejects the protocols of orthodox linguistic philosophy in favour
of a conscious, even artful, play with stylistic possibilities. At the same time, he implies
that it is not just a matter of choosing one’s tradition, siding (say) with Nietzsche and
Heidegger as against the normative regime of stylistic oppression. Rather, it is a question
of  seeing  that  both  these  options  come  down  to  a  choice  of  philosophical  style,  a
commitment to certain operative metaphors and modes of representation.
17 Skilfully  embodying the  larger  intellectual  and moral  attitudes  he  is  recommending,
Rorty speaks in an informal, “down home,” American idiom, a self-consciously pragmatist
cultivation that is intended to undercut more portentous vocabularies and return human
purposes to the centre of the stage. Rorty’s writing has always been accented by a pacy
colloquialism, a style of address that is most pronounced in the third and fourth volumes
of his Philosophical Papers (1997 and 2007, respectively) and in Philosophy and Social Hope
(1998),  what  Rorty  terms  “a  collection of  more  occasional  pieces.”9 These  books  are
replete with Americanisms: “it didn’t pan out,” “put a different spin on it,” “gee-whizz,”
“gypped,” “jump-started,” “pretty much,” “handy ways,” “pin down,” “lay my cards on
the table,” “earn their keep,” “boondoggle,” “gotten some,”10 to mention but a few.
18 Rorty’s reliance on the colloquial and idiomatic highlights the importance of American
vernacular in his writing, a rhetoric he sees as singularly appropriate for the pragmatist
intellectual. He writes with self-effacing charm, a quick and biting wit and a dizzying
capacity for broad analogies. As his thought has changed (from analytic to non-analytic),
so  has  his  style  moved  increasingly  from an  argumentative  to  a  narrative  and  “re-
descriptive” mode. Re-description amounts to a general recognition of the contingency of
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language, a recognition that there is no way to step outside the various vocabularies we
have  employed  and  find  a  “meta-vocabulary”  which  takes  account  of  all  possible
vocabularies, all possible ways of judging and feeling. All we can ever claim is that “it
would be better to say.” A historicist and nominalist culture of the sort Rorty envisages
would settle for this claim, for narratives which connect the present with the past, on the
one hand, and with utopian futures, on the other.
19 The refreshing simplicity of  Rorty’s  prose is  punctuated by moments of  humour and
irreverence. Deflating the time-honoured distinctions within professional philosophy, for
example,  he  writes:  “So  if  one’s  teachers  at  Michigan  assure  one  that  Derrida  is  a
charlatan,  or  if  one’s  teachers  at  Tübingen  suggest  that  formal  semantics  is  just  a
mystification  and  cognitive  science  just  a  boondoggle,  one  may  well  believe  these
propositions for the rest of one’s life.”11 The buoyancy of this prose, together with its
tongue-in-cheek depiction of academic orthodoxies, suggests a loosening of professional
ties.  Its  seeming  lack  of  deference  indicates  a  philosopher  both  sure  of  his  own
professional contribution and his life-long regard for the discipline. This stylistic license
is typical, also, of a philosopher nearing the end of his career, but it is anticipated at
several  brilliant  moments  in  Rorty’s  oeuvre.  Consider,  for  example,  the  opening
paragraph of his essay “Derrida and the Philosophical Tradition” which concludes Truth
and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3: “In the actual world Nietzsche was a twitchy,
irresolute, nomadic nerd who never got a life outside literature. But consider the possible
world  in  which  Nietzsche  got  lucky  early  on,  and  wound  up  a  happy,  affectionate,
suburban paterfamilias” (PP3: 327). In this alternative world, Rorty continues, The Birth of
Tragedy enjoyed a European vogue and Nietzsche’s U.S. lecture tours eclipsed those of
Dickens,  inspiring fan mail  from Mark Twain and H. L. Mencken.  Instead of  breaking
down  at  forty  five,  Rorty  irreverently  speculates,  Nietzsche  kept  right  on  writing,
joyously and prolifically,  “having a great time” (PP3: 327).  This paragraph culminates
with the light-hearted suggestion that “success, sanity and suburbia” might have ruined
Friedrich Nietzsche.  Later  in that  same essay,  Rorty muses on the equally  whimsical
possibility that Hegel identified the synthesis of Being and Nothingness, not as Becoming,
but as “Time or Ambivalence or Sex or Fudge Ripple” (PP3: 339).
20 Rorty has always written with rhetorical flair and colourful elegance, prompting Harold
Bloom to describe him as  “the most  interesting philosopher in the world”12 and Ian
Hacking to review his most recent book as “so blissfully right or infuriatingly wrong.”13
Few philosophers are as engaging to read as Rorty, and few can boast his happy knack for
presenting radical views (among them, his outright rejection of truth and objectivity) as
an easy and agreeable shift of one’s current perspective. A voice that is urbane, witty,
lively  and eloquent,  and characteristically  inflected by American cadence and idiom,
Rorty’s prose style is one of his supreme philosophical achievements.
⁂
21 Exploring the philosophical affinities between Stevens, Cavell and Rorty, what emerges
most  clearly  is  a  common  idea  of  disciplinary  critique.  Questioning  the  essence  of
philosophy (its status as a written discourse, its relationship to poetry and other aesthetic
practices, its modernist condition, its political and social role), the trio are united, most
noticeably,  by  a  shared  resistance  to  philosophical  convention,  by  a  willingness  to
challenge  its  time-honoured  subjects  and  styles.  We  might  say  that  each  figure  is
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encouraged by the “metaphilosophical,” though Cavell would undoubtedly dispute such a
term.14 That each figure recognises the inability of language to record or reflect the world
is evident. All three would trouble the ideal of philosophical writing as transparent, as
they would complicate the traditional boundaries between philosophy and poetry, poetry
and prose. There is a profound sense, in the writings of all three, of the contingency of
words, of the bankruptcy of language, of the deepening need to re-work existing phrases,
metaphors and vocabularies.
22 Returning, then, to our opening epigraph, might we recognize in our philosophical trio
the penury and precariousness, the desperate insecurity, that Donoghue characterises as
peculiarly  American?  Certainly,  the  pursuit  of  one’s  “best  and  most  difficult  self”
anticipates  Cavell’s  modernist  moment  as  it  bespeaks  his  perfectionist  ambition.  His
Emersonian desire  to  win through to  an authentic  mode of  philosophical  expression
recognises this mode as never secure and never static, a continual striving towards one’s
unattained yet attainable self. Cavell, as the title of his book proclaims, is “in quest of the
ordinary.” We might suggest that the desperate conditions of Donoghue’s stylist, “the
immense  strain  required  to  make  the  work  declare  itself”  (Style:  125),  find  their
philosophical expression in Cavell’s perfectionist writings, in their characteristic mood
(of intensity) and momentum (of quest).
23 Stevens’  idea of the poem as enacted mental process registers his own experience of
“precariousness,” his sense that the mind (or imagination) is not a mirror of nature, his
profound  disappointment  with  language,  and  even  profounder  desire  to  test  the
boundaries  of  human  expression.  In  the  poet’s  exertion  of  his  imagination  “upon
situations amounting to failure” (Style: 120), Donoghue finds an affinity between Stevens
and Henry James. Stevens’ method, he argues, “is extensive rather than intensive” and
his favoured form of theme and variation works by redeeming the blank singularity of
objects. “It is a relief for Stevens,” Donoghue writes, “to have thirteen ways of looking at
a blackbird” (Style: 140).
24 Taking up Donoghue’s  idea,  we might  return to  the  earlier  contention that  Stevens’
scepticism about the external world (or, more precisely, his scepticism about the relation
between imagination and reality)  extends to and is  involved with a scepticism about
language.  The  key  point  here  is  that  Stevens’  disappointment  essentially  proves
productive; his poetry emerges most habitually from the dual resources of desire and
limitation. Stevens is never settled in his poetic expression, never exactly secure. In its
constant striving towards this security and stillness, however, his verse quite possibly
achieves its peculiar momentum and edge, a voice that is unflinchingly “Stevens.” Like
Cavell,  Stevens certainly exhibits  touches of  this  characteristic,  this  characteristically
American, “style of failure.” The awareness of language’s finitude leads to a struggle with
language, a war with words. In both writers, and again attempting a gloss on Donoghue,
conditions of desperation and struggle prove generative.
25 The compromises, exertions and self-defeats that Cavell and Stevens take care to register
align them with a strain of American writing that wrests creativity from struggle, and
style from failure. What brings poet and philosopher closest together is a shared sense of
precarious involvement, a willingness to test the very boundaries of human experience
and expression. These “signs of risk and strain” (Style: 125), however, are simply not to be
found in the writings of Rorty. It is a mark of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism that he chooses the
shadow side (or maybe the happy side) of Stevens’ and Cavell’s acknowledgement. His
own recognition of  contingency leads  to  a  celebration of  language as  liberating  and
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creative, and to a companion emphasis on self-creation and play. Rorty is sprightly before
he is  anxious.  Indeed,  given the charges  of  flippancy and carelessness  often levelled
against him, Rorty is possibly too secure in the possession of his style. The cheerful ease of
Rorty’s prose reveals that he is simply untroubled by those meanings that might emerge
as accidental or unintended.
26 Given  this  profound  disparity,  it  seems  misguided  to  extract  from  the  present
consideration of philosophical  styles  (offering Stevens,  Cavell  and Rorty,  in a  certain
sense, as “case studies” or “examples”) any levelling claims about philosophical writing in
general. Stevens’ status as a poet, of course, would itself postpone any such attempts at
overview or generalization. The resonance of Donoghue’s depiction of American literary
style (with Cavell and Stevens, at least, though it is certainly more difficult to hear in
Rorty),  not  to mention the figures’  own desire to situate themselves within a native
tradition, still encourages a consideration of the figures’ essential Americanness, and hints,
moreover, at a further avenue of inquiry: What, if anything, is to be gained by juxtaposing
America’s philosophical poetry with its philosophical prose? Is there a characteristically
American philosophical style?
27 In comparing the styles of American and French philosophical writing, James Conant has
recently noted the characteristic “diffidence” of writers like Thoreau when compared to
the  characteristic  “brilliance”  of  intellectuals  like  Derrida.15 Conant  provocatively
suggests that this Parisian brilliance most typically registers “what is now taken as the
sound of philosophy.” “The sound of much of the language in Thoreau’s Walden,”  he
continues, “is apt to strike a reader – at least on a first encounter – as not particularly
philosophical at all, as not even trying to sound like philosophy” (America: 60).
28 In comparing the sound of Emerson, James and Stevens with that of Nietzsche, Foucault
and Derrida, Poirier makes a similar point: “it should be apparent by now,” he writes,
“that  in  presenting  their  case,  the  Americans  simply  sound  different.  They  sound
altogether less rhetorically embattled,  less culturally ambitious,  than do any of these
European  cousins.”16 Rorty,  interestingly,  is  quick  to  defend  Anglo-American  prose
against  the  French.  French  philosophers,  he  urges,  specialize  in  inventing  new
vocabularies.  While  this  speciality  accords  nicely  with  his  own desire  to  move from
argument to re-description, Rorty still maintains that adopting a new vocabulary only
makes sense if you can move back and forth, dialectically, between the old and the new.
He writes: “It seems to us as if our French colleagues are too willing to find, or make, a
linguistic islet  and then invite people to move onto it,  and not interested enough in
building causeways between such islets and the mainland.”17
29 The  sound  of  Anglo-American  philosophy,  of  course,  is  a  central  preoccupation  of
Cavell’s. “About my own sound,” he writes, “it may help to say that while I may often
leave ideas in what seems a more literary state,  sometimes in a more psychoanalytic
state, than a philosopher might wish […] I mean to leave everything I will say, or have, I
guess, ever said, as in a sense provisional,  the sense that it is to be gone on from.”18
Certainly, Cavell’s style owes just as much to psychoanalysis as it does to philosophy,
emphasizing the temptations and anxieties of the speaking self, employing language as a
form of therapy. In conceding Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the functions and contexts of
language  as  fundamental  to  American  pragmatism,  furthermore,  Cavell  is  more
concerned to stress how different their arguments sound. “And in philosophy,” he writes,
“it is the sound which makes all the difference” (MMW: 36 fn31). As a student of Cavell’s,
Conant would be well aware of this centrality, not only in Cavell’s desire to maintain his
Stylists in the American Grain
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
8
distance from pragmatism, but in his broader philosophical project. Aside from noting
the “diffident” and “non-philosophical” sound of Thoreau, however, Conant doesn’t push
further on what a characteristically American philosophical writing might sound like.
30 Diffidence,  surely,  is rarely  audible  in  Rorty.  Though  his  style is  unaffected,  and  his
ambitious  claims  presented  with  disarming  modesty,  he  is  more  likely  to  give  the
impression of self-assurance (his harshest critics would say “brashness”) than timidity or
reserve. Interestingly, his colleagues have always drawn attention to the curious disparity
between his spoken and written tone. Rorty’s voice, as Daniel Dennett notes, “is sort of
striking – those firebrand views delivered in the manner of Eeyore.” Of Rorty’s mode of
presentation, the British philosopher Jonathan Rée says, “There’s a tremendous kind of
melancholy about it. He tries to be a gay Nietzschean, but it’s an effort for him.” For
Conant, hearing Rorty speak for the first time was something of a revelation. “It’s easy to
read his  writings  in a  register  of  excitement  and a heightened breathless  voice,”  he
explains. “But the note that I heard when he was reading these sentences in his own
cadence and rhythm was – for want of a better word – depression. I thought, this is the
voice of a man who feels as if he’s been let down or betrayed by philosophy.” Jürgen
Habermas  similarly  concurs  that  Rorty’s  antiphilosophy  “seems  to  spring  from  the
melancholy of a disappointed metaphysician.”19
31 The disparity  between Rorty’s  written and spoken voice  contrasts  interestingly  with
Cavell, whose audiences have always commented on their striking continuity. Paul Jenner
has traced this correspondence to Cavell’s training in music, to the philosopher’s avowed
desire  to  return  the  human voice  to  philosophy.20 Jenner  writes:  “At  odds  with  the
prevailing  philosophical  fashion,  with  Derrida’s  post-structuralist  and  deconstructive
wish to unpick the dominance of the voice (understood in opposition to a denigrated
“writing”)  within the philosophical  canon,  Cavell’s appeal  to the voice is  manifest  in
Austin and Wittgenstein’s appeal to the ordinary or everyday in language. The appeal to
the voice, in this sense, need not be understood as an instance of Derrida’s metaphysics of
presence;  it  is  more suggestive of  fracture and failure,  of  a  habitual  distance in our
relations to self, others, world and language.”21
32 Conant’s suggestion of American writing as diffident is further troubled, of course, by the
curiously non-Thoreauvian pitch of Cavell. Cavell has always sought, as Jenner and others
point out, to distance himself from the institutional dominance of deconstruction, taking
care  to  present  himself  as  an  American  writer  inheriting  a  specifically  American
tradition. His misgivings toward deconstruction, however, are to be sharply distinguished
from his evaluation of Derrida as a philosopher. There is, for Cavell, notable affinities
between his own writing and that of Derrida; most importantly, the philosophers share a
sense of the necessity in questioning the grounds of their own philosophy and discourse.22
33 In many ways, Cavell comes closer to Derrida than Rorty, even though it is Rorty who has
consistently  championed  Derrida  as  the  ultimate  writer  of  philosophy,  the  ultimate
strong poet, the ultimate “maker of the new.” This leads to a paradoxical situation, and
again frustrates any easy generalizations about native philosophical style. Rorty sounds
like an American, certainly, but more the gaudy American of cultural stereotype than the
diffident figure at Walden. Meanwhile, the quiet gentilities of Cavell’s prose can surely
remember Thoreau, but their spiralling self-consciousness can just as easily recall the
indirections (less sympathetic critics would say the “indulgences”) of Derrida.
34 In a remarkable 1980 review of The Claim of Reason, John Hollander argued that Cavell’s
book charted “a poetico-philosophical no-man’s land” and, by doing so, that it occupied
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“the  buffer  zone  between  poetry  and  philosophy  in  a  unique  and  perhaps  uniquely
American  way.”23 In  responding  to  Hollander’s  review,  Cavell  wrote:  “It  is  greatly
heartening to me that Hollander finds a weight for ‘poetic’ with which my philosophizing
may  be  found  poetic.  I  believe  Hollander  is  right  in  finding  my  mode  essentially
American.”24 That Hollander, himself a highly regarded philosopher and poet, considers
Cavell’s “poetico-philosophical” expression distinctively American is suggestive. Cavell’s
gracious response is anticipated by his own desire to hear the romanticist redemption of
philosophy by poetry in his own writing, together with his desire to view America in
general as the place that promises romanticism, that promises to heal the wound between
philosophy and literature that has been festering since Plato’s Republic.25
35 Equally suggestive,  and certainly more surprising,  is  the companion attention to this
poetico-philosophical “no-man’s land” or “buffer zone” encouraged, albeit indirectly, by
the pragmatist philosopher, Cornel West. In The American Evasion of Philosophy, in seeking
to consolidate Emerson’s status as America’s proto-pragmatist, West quotes Dewey, who
in turn quotes Emerson: “[Emerson] would work, he says, by art, not metaphysics, finding
truth “in the sonnet and the play.” ‘I am,’ to quote him again, ‘in all my theories, ethics
and politics, a poet,’ and we may, I think, safely take his word for it that he meant to be a
maker rather than a reflector. His own preference was to be ranked with the seers rather
than  with  the  reasoners  of  the  race.”26 Dewey  understands  Emerson’s  evasion  of
philosophy, West argues, as neither a simple replacement of philosophy by poetry nor a
rekindling of the Platonic quarrel. Instead, this evasion is to be understood as “a situating
of philosophical reflection and poetic creation in the midst of quotidian struggles for
meaning” (Evasion: 73). This Emersonian evasion, which West proposes to extend to all of
American  philosophy,  views  poetry  and  philosophy  neither  as  identical  nor  as
antagonistic,  but “as different metaphor-deploying activities to achieve specific aims”
(Evasion: 73).
36 In West’s formulation, American pragmatism can be understood as what happens to the
Emersonian evasion of  epistemology-centred philosophy when forced to  justify  itself
within the professional perimeters of academic philosophy. Whereas Peirce applies the
Emersonian themes of contingency and revisability to the scientific method, West argues,
James extends them to our personal and moral lives. The emphasis on poetry and art, “on
the seers rather than the reasoners of the race,” that he extracts from Dewey’s reading of
Emerson is duly translated into West’s own pragmatist programme, into his emphasis on
the  centrality  of  “metaphor-deploying  activities.”  This  latter  phrase  would  certainly
resonate with Rorty. Priding themselves on evading philosophy, both Rorty and West
would extend the meaning of “metaphor-deploying activities,” from “poetic creation” to
“cultural criticism,” and so define the ambitions of pragmatism in general.
37 Cavell,  of  course,  has  long registered both his  discomfort  with  pragmatism,  and the
related  efforts,  of  West  and  Rorty  among  others,  to  establish  pragmatism  as  the
essentially  American  philosophical  voice.  The  proposed  assimilation  of  Emerson  to
pragmatism, according to Cavell, “unfailingly blunts the particularity, the achievement,
of Emerson’s language.”27 The Emerson with whom he seeks to affiliate his own work
differs significantly from the proto-pragmatist posited by West as the chief source of this
line of American thought. Cavell wants to demonstrate an Emerson to whom others have
condescended or who they have simply ruled out: an Emerson well aware of the power of
evil, the potential of tragedy, and the full weight of scepticism; an Emerson as receptive
as he is assertive, and much closer to Wallace Stevens than he is to Dewey or to Quine.
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38 This  existentialist  Emerson,  surely,  could just  as  easily  be aligned with the strain of
American literature identified by Donoghue. His own “desperate scepticism” might be
registered by the indirections and meanderings of  his  prose,  the formal  feature that
brings Emerson closest to Cavell. Both Emerson and Cavell demonstrate a willingness to
follow through on idea or example unsure of the final destination or upshot, letting ideas
“find their weight” in their individual emergences. Captured in their emphasis on the
sound of the prevailing philosophical vocabulary, furthermore, is the alternative sense of
sound as measurement. Cavell, for one, would certainly welcome a comparison between
his  and  Emerson’s  “sounding”  of  the  depths  of  language  and Thoreau’s  activities  at
Walden. Sounding and weighing are activities that require patience, and Cavell follows
the transcendentalists  in continually counselling persistence,  waiting,  resourcefulness
and hope, “in the face of discouraging odds and the inevitability of disappointment.”28
Wishing to stay faithful to their own volatility and instinct, Emerson and Cavell proceed
always  by  indirection  and  improvisation,  following  Donoghue’s  traditional  American
stylist “who does not rush upon it – he delays, allowing the forms to do their best work”
(Style: 103).29
39 Returning  to  The  American  Evasion  of  Philosophy,  we  might  identify  certain  aesthetic
strands that emerge from West’s account that exceed the scope and intention of his own
book.  These  strands,  in  turn,  might  yet  conciliate  those  philosophers  who  find  in
American  philosophy  alternative  resonances  to  pragmatism.  West  writes  of  “poetic
creation” as a “metaphor-deploying activity,” one that exemplifies the heights of human
intelligence at work, “the best of conscious and reflective human activity” (Evasion: 73).
Poetic creation, in this sense, is taken from poetry’s etymological root, “poeisis,” meaning
the creative production of meaning. It is undoubtedly this sense of poetry that allows
Rorty to align such diverse figures as Galileo and Yeats, Francis Bacon and John Milton.30
Choosing the more traditional sense of “poetic creation,” however, we are lead to more
formal implications, to an idea of writing that privileges not just the contingent and the
revisable, but the figural and the logically evasive: more poetry than poeisis, to put it
simply.
40 Speculating further, we might weave these aesthetic strands into an alternative narrative
of American philosophy. On this re-description, “evasion” might not signal a traditionally
American avoidance of problems of knowledge or criteria of certainty. Donoghue and
Poirier, certainly, find these problems consistently taken up by American literature, as
they go to the very heart of the philosophical life of Emerson, of Stevens, and of Cavell.
“Evasion,”  rather,  if  understood  in  its  literary  critical  sense  of  “ambiguity”  or
“vagueness,” might gesture towards the kind of writing that even neo-pragmatism is
keen to encourage, if not always to enact. In Rorty’s own terms, this form of philosophical
expression is suggestive and multialent, “funnier, more allusive, sexier and, above all,
more ‘written’.”31
41 Finding  in  West’s  narrative  this  alternative  story  of  American  philosophy,  we  are
reminded of the “poetico-philosophical no-man’s land” that Hollander once pictured as
uniquely American. Such a region, Hollander wrote, might offer a distinctively American
way of mediating between analytic and continental  traditions.32 With these American
evasions  and  mediations  in  mind,  an  alternative  sense  and  significance  for  “poetic
creation” in the story of  American philosophy emerges.  On this model,  philosophical
expression  is  prized  for  aesthetic  and  evocative  qualities  as  well  as  transparency.
Alternative conceptions of lucidity and completeness, alternative ways of being precise,
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are  entertained.  Emerson’s  central  status,  in  turn,  might  be  founded  less  on  his
metaphor-deploying activity, and more on the curious indirections of his prose. He might
emerge as the philosophical  predecessor not only of Dewey,  Quine and Rorty,  but of
Santayana,  Stevens  and  Cavell.  These  latter  figures  undoubtedly  inhabit  the
poeticohilosophical  “no-man’s  land”  and  return  us,  finally,  to  the  possibility  of  a
distinctively American philosophical style: a style that opens to the evasive, the excessive
and the ‘written,’ that answers to America’s poets as well as her pragmatists.
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ABSTRACTS
Writing on the death of Jean Baudrillard in March 2007, Julian Baggini dismissed Anglo-American
philosophy (as compared to its  French counterpart)  as  utterly without style,  as  “the literary
equivalent of Alan Partridge’s sports-casual fashion collection.” A damning indictment, indeed.
Contesting  Baggini’s  claim,  this  article  proposes  an  American  poet  and  two  American
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philosophers – Wallace Stevens, Stanley Cavell and Richard Rorty – as supreme stylists of the
philosophical. Combining elegance and verve with an edifying mix of philosophical dedication
and critique, the chosen trio are philosophical stylists in the best sense of the term. With due
attendance to their inheritance of the transcendentalist and pragmatist legacies, I propose an
engagement  with  their  writing  styles  as  opening  instructively  to  a  broader  consideration  of
philosophical  writing  in  America,  including  the  possibility  of  a  distinctively  American
philosophical style.
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